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User Financing in a National Payments for Environmental Services 
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Allen Blackman and Richard T. Woodward 
Abstract 
National government-funded payments for environmental services (PES) programs often lack 
sustainable financing and fail to target payments to providers of important environmental services. In 
principle, these problems can be mitigated by supplementing government financing with contributions 
from leading environmental service users. We use original survey data and official statistics to analyze 
user financing in Costa Rica’s renowned national PES program, focusing on the amounts and sources of 
user financing, the drivers of contributions, and contributors’ perceptions of the PES program. We find 
that user financing has supported less than three percent of the acres enrolled in the program and that 
hydroelectric plants are the largest private sector contributors. Large hydroelectric plants tend to 
contribute while small ones do not. The weight of evidence suggests that in addition to ensuring the 
provision of forest environmental services, hydroelectric plants’ motives for contributing to the PES 
program include improving relations with local communities and government regulators—common 
drivers of participation in all manner of voluntary environmental programs. These findings raise questions 
about the potential of user financing to improve the efficiency and financial sustainability of national PES 
programs. 
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User Financing in a National Payments for Environmental Services 
Program: Costa Rican Hydropower 
Allen Blackman and Richard T. Woodward∗ 
1. Introduction 
Payments for environmental services (PES)—cash transfers from users of environmental 
services to providers of these services conditional upon continued provision—are an increasingly 
popular environmental management tool.1 More than 300 PES programs have been implemented 
worldwide (Pagiola and Platais 2002; Wunder et al. 2008). Most have a limited geographic scope 
and are financed directly by users of specific environmental services—for example, payments by 
downstream users of hydrological services to upstream land managers in a single watershed. 
However, a handful of programs—including in China, Costa Rica, Mexico, and South Africa—
have a national scope and are financed by the government acting on behalf of users of 
environmental services throughout the country (Wunder 2005; Engel et al. 2008; Pagiola 2007).  
Compared with more common user-financed initiatives, national government-financed 
PES programs have advantages and disadvantages (Engel et al. 2008; Wunder et al. 2008; 
Pagiola and Platais 2007; Mayrand and Paquin 2004; FAO 2003). The main advantage is 
economies of scale. PES programs entail significant transaction costs that stem from identifying 
and matching service providers and users, negotiating conditional contracts, monitoring 
compliance, and enforcing contract terms. National programs are able to spread these costs over 
a large number of agents, in theory facilitating PES agreements that would be too costly for 
                                                 
∗ Senior authorship is shared. Blackman is Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future and Research Fellow at the 
Environment for Development Center for Central America. Woodward is Associate Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University and Research Associate with the Environment for Development 
Center for Central America. Blackman received financial support from the EfD Initiative and Resources for the 
Future. Woodward received financial support from a Fulbright fellowship and Texas AgriLife Research with support 
from the Cooperative State Research, Education & Extension Service, Hatch Project, TEX8604. We thank our 
interviewees, particularly Alberto Garcia and Alexandra Saenz of FONAFIFO and Manrique Rojas of Edificadora 
Beta, for sharing insights and data, and Rebecca Osakwe at CATIE for research assistance. 
1 The term PES has been applied somewhat indiscriminately to a wide range of economic incentive policies from 
national park entrance fees to ecocertification (Engel et al. 2008). According to Wunder (2005), a payment for 
environmental services is defined as (i) a voluntary transaction where (ii) a well-defined environmental service (or a 
land use likely to secure that service) (iii) is being “bought” by a (minimum one) service buyer (iv) from a 
(minimum one) service provider (v) if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality).   Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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private parties, and even subnational entities, to negotiate on their own.2 An important 
disadvantage is inefficiency. Because national governments are not direct users of environmental 
services, they generally do not have detailed local knowledge about the value, provision, and use 
of these services. In addition, they are swayed by political and bureaucratic interests. As a result, 
as discussed in the next section, they often do a poor job of identifying providers of important 
environmental services, negotiating cost-effective contracts, and monitoring compliance. A 
second potential disadvantage of national PES programs, also discussed in the next section, is 
that they may lack sustainable long-term financing. They depend principally on national tax 
revenues and international assistance, which are vulnerable to changing political and 
macroeconomic conditions. 
In theory, those problems could be mitigated by expanding what is typically a minor 
component of national PES programs: voluntary payments by individual users of specific 
environmental services to government administrators to underwrite PES contracts with providers 
of these services. For example, breweries that depend on forest hydrological services might make 
payments that enable government administrators to underwrite PES contracts with upstream land 
managers. Such user financing could augment the above-mentioned advantages of national PES 
programs in several ways. First, environmental service users that voluntarily contribute to the 
system could help identify the most important service providers. Second, volunteers’ 
contributions to the program could shed light on the value of these services. Third, volunteers 
would have both clear incentives to help monitor compliance with PES contracts and the means 
to enforce them: they could discontinue funding if payees do not meet their commitments 
(Pagiola and Platais 2007). Improved efficiency aside, user financing would help extend and 
diversify financing in a national program. The potential benefits of expanding user-financing in 
national PES program have not been lost on policymakers. For example, in order to realize these 
benefits, the World Bank is currently supporting the expansion of the user-financed components 
of national PES programs in Costa Rica and Mexico.  
Nevertheless, it is not clear that voluntary user financing would actually confer those 
benefits. It is a type of voluntary environmental regulatory program—that is, a program that 
                                                 
2 Transaction cost advantages depend on the type of environmental service on which the PES program focuses. For 
example, transaction costs associated with conditional payments for global environmental services such as carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity preservation are likely to be higher than those associated with payments for local 
environmental services like facilitating aquifer recharge, since the cost of linking service providers and users is 
likely to be higher in the case of global services. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.   Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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provides incentives but not mandates for agents to protect the environment. Considerable 
research suggests that that firms and farms participate in such programs for reasons that may 
have little to do with their stated goals, including winning favor with regulators, consumers, and 
local communities (de Leon and Rivera 2009; Lyon and Maxwell 2002). If environmental 
service users contribute to a national PES program for these reasons, then it is less clear that the 
efficiency benefits noted above will be achieved, although such contributions would certainly 
help diversify the program’s funding base. 
The best-known national government-financed PES system with a user-financed 
component is Costa Rica’s Payments for Environmental Services (Pagos por Servicios 
Ambientales, PSA) program.3 Initiated in 1997, this program pays land managers to conserve and 
restore forest cover. Most of the payment contracts are negotiated between land managers and 
the National Forest Finance Fund (Fondo Nacional de Financiamento Forestal, FONAFIFO), 
the government agency that administers the program. Funded by national fuel tax revenue and 
grants and loans from bilateral and multilateral donors, for the most part the program operates 
without direct input from users of environmental services. However, the program invites 
individual hydroelectric plants, breweries, irrigated farms, and other organizations that benefit 
from environmental services to pay FONAFIFO to negotiate contracts with the providers of 
these services. To date, more than 40 entities have voluntarily contributed some US$8 million to 
FONAFIFO under these provisions (Table 2). Although numerous studies have examined Costa 
Rica’s PSA program, empirical analysis of the user-financed component is limited.4 We believe 
further study is needed to understand the potential benefits of user financing in national PES 
programs. Toward this end, we address three questions about the user financing in Costa Rica’s 
PSA program: 
 
i.  How many and what types of environmental service users are participating? 
ii.  What factors are driving participation? 
iii.  In the view of environmental service users, how has the program performed?  
 
                                                 
3 South Africa’s Working for Water program also has a small user-financed component (Turpie et al. 2008). 
4 Pagiola (2008) includes an overview of the user-financed component of the FONAFIFO program primarily using 
publicly available data, and Miranda et al. (2007) present qualitative case studies of the first seven agreements 
between users of environmental services and FONAFIFO. By contrast, we focus principally on agreements with 
hydroelectric plants and we use original quantitative and qualitative survey data. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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To answer the first question, we use data on PSA program finances provided by 
FONAFIFO. To answer the remaining questions, we rely principally on an original 2008 survey 
of Costa Rica’s private hydroelectricity plants. We focus on these plants for several reasons. 
They constitute the plurality of participants in the user-financed component of the PSA program. 
In addition, some plants have participated in the program and others have not, variation that can 
help identify the drivers of participation. Moreover, the total number of plants is small enough 
that we have been able to conduct in-person interviews with virtually all of them. Finally, these 
plants are arguably less likely than government-owned hydroelectric plants to be influenced 
mainly by political pressures.   
We find that direct user financing from all sources has funded less than 3 percent of the 
area enrolled in the PSA program. After publicly owned hydroelectric plants, private 
hydroelectric companies have been the largest contributor of user financing. We find that larger 
private hydroelectric plants are much more likely to contribute than small ones. Their motives 
for participation in the PSA program are mixed. In addition to ensuring the provision of forest 
environmental services, motives for contributing to the PSA program include improving relations 
with local communities and government regulators—common drivers of participation in most 
voluntary environmental programs. Despite generally positive views about its performance, some 
hydroelectric plants favor direct investment in watershed protection over voluntary contributions 
to the program. Together, these findings raise questions about the potential of user financing to 
improve the efficiency and financial sustainability of national PES programs for hydrological 
services. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the 
literature on national PES programs and on the drivers of participation in voluntary 
environmental programs in general. The third section provides background on Costa Rica’s PSA 
program and private hydroelectricity sector. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections address the three 
focus questions listed above. The last section summarizes our findings and considers their policy 
implications. 
2. Literature 
The first part of this section reviews the empirical literature on national government-
financed PES programs, focusing on the two weaknesses discussed above—inefficiency and 
unsustainable financing—and on the two national PES programs in developing countries that 
have been evaluated extensively: Costa Rica’s PSA program and Mexico’s Payment for 
Environmental Hydrological Services (Pago de Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos, PSAH) Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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program. The second part of this section reviews the literature on the drivers of participation in 
voluntary environmental programs.  
2.1. National Government-Financed PES Programs 
There is an emerging consensus in the literature that in their early incarnations, both 
Costa Rica’s PSA program and Mexico’s PSAH program were not as effective as they could 
have been at targeting forested areas that both provide important environmental services and face 
a significant risk of deforestation (Robalino et al. 2008; Wünscher et al. 2008; Hartshorn et al. 
2005; Sierra and Russman 2006). As discussed below, the main component of Costa Rica’s PSA 
program aims to provide hydrological benefits, biodiversity, and other environmental services by 
paying managers of forested lands to retain forest cover. Yet as of 2005, only 35 percent of the 
land participating in the PSA program was in a watershed with downstream users of hydrological 
services, and depending on the definition of biodiversity priority areas, 30–65 percent of PSA 
land was in biodiversity priority areas (Pagiola 2008). Targeting of payments to land that 
provides important ecosystem services has improved over time (Pagiola 2008; Barton et al. 
2009). However, the challenge of targeting for additionality remains. Virtually all rigorous 
statistical analyses based on forest cover data derived from satellite images find that the PSA 
program has done little to slow deforestation, largely because land at high risk of deforestation 
has not been volunteered into the program. Rather, the lion’s share of land enrolled in the 
program has been ill-suited for agriculture, pasture, and other cleared land uses and very 
probably would have remained forested absent the program (Pfaff et al. 2008; Robalino et al. 
2008; Arriagada et al. in press; Sills et al. forthcoming).5 Wünscher et al. (2008), Hartshorn et al. 
(2005), and Sierra and Russman (2006) all find that the PSA program could benefit from 
improved targeting.6  
Mexico’s PSAH program shares many of PSA’s design elements, including a focus on 
forest conservation and voluntary enrollment. However, as its name suggests, the program aims 
specifically at ensuring the provision of hydrological benefits. Also, its administrators have made 
an effort to target high-benefit areas. Evaluations of the early years of the program (to our 
                                                 
5 A second reason the program has had little impact on deforestation is that there has been little deforestation. As 
Pagiola (2008) notes, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the program from other factors that have contributed 
to reduced deforestation, including strict command-and-control regulations and declining returns to pasture. 
6 An exception is Tattenbach et al. (2006). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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knowledge, the only evaluations currently available) suggest that initial targeting efforts were 
disappointing. In 2006, 51 percent of land enrolled in the program was in watersheds classified 
as “not overexploited,” and 68 percent was deemed to have low or very low deforestation risk 
(Muñoz-Piña 2008; Alix-Garcia et al. 2005). Subsequent targeting efforts may have been more 
effective.   
Concerns have also been raised about the sustainability of the financing for Costa Rica’s 
PSA program and Mexico’s PSAH program. As discussed below, Costa Rica’s PSA program is 
financed by national fuel and water taxes as dictated by a 1997 Costa Rican law, and by grants 
and loans from bilateral and multilateral donors. However, these funds have not been nearly 
sufficient to enroll all the landowners who have applied to the program (Pagiola 2008). For 
example, in 2006, one of FONAFIFO’s principal regional offices had enough funds to enroll 
only one-sixth of the hectares for which it received applications (Wünscher et al. 2008). Whereas 
funding for Costa Rica’s PSA program is theoretically guaranteed by 1997 legislation, funding 
for the PSAH program must be approved each year. According to Alix-Garcia (2005, 70), “This 
does probably not qualify as a sustainable financial arrangement since, though it has been written 
into law, it is decoupled from the intentions of the program and subject to the political process.” 
In the end, the sustainability and sufficiency of government funding for these programs depend 
on political will. To date, that will has endured in both countries, but there is no guarantee that it 
will continue to do so.  
2.2. Voluntary Environmental Programs 
As noted in Section 1, the user-financed component of Costa Rica’s PSA program is a 
type of voluntary environmental program. Empirical research on the drivers of participation in 
such programs suggests that pressures applied by regulators and communities drive participation, 
as does variation in transaction costs associated with joining these programs. The first type of 
pressure has probably attracted the most attention. Considerable research suggests that private 
parties participate in voluntary regulatory programs to preempt more stringent mandatory 
regulation or—particularly germane for our analysis—to obtain preferential treatment from 
regulators (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Maxwell et al. 2000). For example, anecdotal evidence 
about Project XL, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s flagship voluntary program 
during the 1990s, suggests that firms obtained significant production cost advantages from 
participation because EPA provided preferential “regulatory relief” (Marcus et al. 2002). 
Similarly, studies have found that U.S. firms that engage in voluntary abatement obtain 
regulatory permits more quickly than those that have not (Cothran 1993; Decker 2003). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
7 
Pressures generated by communities and nongovernmental organizations may also create 
incentives for firms to join voluntary programs. Such pressures are the focus of the literature on 
so-called informal regulation, which mostly consists of cross-sectional, plant-level econometric 
analyses of environmental performance in developing countries (see Blackman in press for a 
review). For example, in the early 1990s, pressures applied by industry and neighborhood 
organizations spurred participation in voluntary clean fuels initiatives targeting small brick kilns 
in Mexico (Blackman and Bannister 1998).  
Finally, differences across firms in transaction costs associated with joining voluntary 
regulatory programs due to, among other things, differences in human capital may help explain 
participation (Delmas and Marcus 2004). For example, transaction costs associated with 
participating in Project XL averaged more than $450,000 per firm, varied considerably across 
firms, and deterred some firms from participating (Blackman and Mazurek 2001).  
3. Background  
3.1. Costa Rica’s PSA Program 
Costa Rica’s program is one of the oldest and most extensive PES programs and has been 
widely studied (Pagiola 2008; Robalino et al. 2008; Rojas and Aylward 2003; Rodriguez 2005; 
Kosoy et al. 2007). Along with Costa Rica’s system of protected areas, it is a testament to the 
country’s unusually strong commitment to forest conservation.  
Costa Rica’s policies have not always been so forest friendly, however. For example, the 
Forestry Act of 1969 (No. 4475) authorized subsidies for converting forest to pasture. It was not 
until the 1980s, in the wake of growing domestic and international concern over reports that 
Costa Rica’s forest cover had shrunk to just over a quarter of its land area, that the government 
reversed course and began providing subsidies to encourage reforestation (for commercial timber 
production) and the conservation of existing forests (Pagiola 2008). The Forestry Act of 1996 
(No. 7575) transformed this system of subsidies into national payments for an ecosystem 
services program and created FONAFIFO, a semiautonomous branch of the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy (Ministerio de Ambiente, Energía y Telecomunicaciones, MINAET), to Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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manage the new program.7 A major motive for creating the PSA program was to recast 
reforestation and conservation subsidies as payments for environmental services—namely 
biodiversity, carbon sequestration, scenic beauty, and hydrological benefits (Pagiola 2008). The 
Forestry Act of 1996 also prohibited conversion of forest to any other type of land use, a 
provision that has significantly slowed deforestation and also has made disentangling the 
independent effect of the PSA program problematic.  
Although the PSA initiative is not the only one involving payments for ecosystem 
services in Costa Rica, it is by far the largest.8 It has comprised a number of modalities targeting 
different types of activities and land uses. In each, a landowner receives annual payments to 
carry out specified practices, such as preserving existing forest cover or planting new trees. As of 
June 2009, FONAFIFO had made payments through these programs on a cumulative total of 
nearly 430,000 hectares (Table 1). By far the most important of the modalities is Forest 
Protection, which accounts for 85 percent of all land that has received FONAFIFO payments. 
Two other modalities—Reforestation and Forest Management—have accounted for 9 percent 
and 3 percent of all hectares receiving payments, respectively, and the rest have collectively 
accounted for 2 percent.9 
                                                 
7 When the PSA program first started, land managers’ participation was solicited by the National System of 
Protected Areas (Sistema Nacional de Areas de Conservacion, SINAC) and by nongovernmental organizations, 
most notably the Foundation for the Development of the Central Range (Fundación para el Desarrollo de la 
Cordillera Central, FUNDECOR). In 2003, FONAFIFO took over this function (Pagiola 2008). In this paper we do 
not differentiate between FUNDECOR projects and those of FONAFIFO. 
8 The PES agreement between the La Esperanza hydroelectric plant and the Monteverde Conservation League does 
not involve FONAFIFO (Rojas and Aylward 2002). 
9 The remaining 2 percent includes the agroforestry program, which pays landowners based on number of trees 
planted rather than the number of hectares enrolled. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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Table 1. Cumulative enrollment in PSA program: Percentage of all (429,361) hectares 
enrolled from 1997 to June 2009, by modality and funding source  












Forest Protection  38  7  37  3  85 
Reforestation 4  2  3 0  9 
Forest Management  2  1  0  0  3 
Others 1  0  1  0  2 
All modalities  45 10  41  3 100 
aInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
bGlobal Environment Facility. 
cGerman International Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). 
dSee Table 2 and discussion in text.  
Source: FONAFIFO (2009). 
 
The Forest Protection modality requires landowners to preserve primary or secondary 
forest cover on their land for five years, a commitment that can be renewed. FONAFIFO makes a 
partial payment to the landowner when she signs a program contract. Subsequent payments are 
made only after a third party verifies that tree cover has not been cleared.10 With a few minor 
exceptions, payments are the same everywhere in the country. They have increased over time 
partly to account for inflation. Annual per hectare payments were US$40 in 1997, when the PSA 
program was created, rose to US$43 in 2005, and to US$64 in 2006 (Pagiola 2008).  
FONAFIFO’s funding for payments to land managers has been derived from four sources 
(Table 1). Tax revenue—from a national tax on gasoline (3.5 percent of the total gasoline tax), 
supplemented since 2006 by revenue from a national tariff on water use (25 percent of the total 
tariff)—is the main continuing source of funds for the program. Other sources of funds have 
played an important role as well. As Table 1 indicates, loans (to be repaid with tax revenues) and 
grants from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and grants from the 
Global Environment Facility have financed payments for 45 percent of all hectares enrolled in 
                                                 
10 Monitoring of compliance by landowners participating in the FONAFIFO program is the responsibility of 
MINAET and SINAC. Pagiola (2008) considers this monitoring system “strong” and calls the database used to track 
compliance “state-of-the-art.” Monitoring records for at least some of the program’s contracts can be accessed 
online (http://www.catie.ac.cr/BancoConocimiento/E/econofor_-_verificacion_csa/econofor_-
_verificacion_csa.asp).  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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FONAFIFO programs.11 The German International Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau) has financed another 10 percent. FONAFIFO’s ordinary budget, derived from 
taxes and tariffs, has paid for 41 percent of all participating hectares. Finally, a variety of users 
have financed FONAFIFO payments to 3 percent of total hectares. The present paper focuses on 
this last portion: user-financed funding.12,13 
FONAFIFO has offered users of hydrological environmental services two types of 
contractual arrangements for making voluntary contributions to fund payments for environmental 
services. Early contributions were made through ad hoc agreements in which both the number of 
hectares receiving payments and the amount paid per hectare were negotiated by FONAFIFO 
and the volunteer contributor. Starting in 2003, FONAFIFO introduced a standard payment, a 
certificate of environmental service (Certificado de Servicio Ambientale, CSA) to facilitate 
relatively small contributions. A CSA covers the full cost of a payment for a single year for a 
single hectare. A CSA cost $43 in 2005 and $64 in 2007.  
In addition to these two voluntary options for contributing to the PSA program, a recent 
law created a mandatory user contribution. The 2006 water law (Canon de Agua) significantly 
raised water-use tariffs (starting from a very low level) and required that a quarter of the revenue 
from these tariffs be transferred to FONAFIFO to help finance PSA contracts. Under this law, 
individual water users can deduct from their tariff obligations any monies paid directly to 
FONAFIFO’s PSA program. This provision creates incentives for water users to make direct 
contributions to the program and purports to give them more input into how and where 
FONAFIFO uses their funds from the tariff.  
                                                 
11 A $32.6 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is to be repaid by 
FONAFIFO with fuel tax revenues over a 12-year period starting in 2006.  
12 Although we do not count them as user financing, GEF grants used to support payments for environmental 
service could be considered as such, since the PSA program aims to preserve biodiversity, a global public good, and 
GEF purports to be biodiversity service users’ agent.  
13 User financing was not an original feature of the PSA program. However, soon after the program was created in 
1996, FONAFIFO began to search for additional sources of funding. This effort quickly led to the hydroelectric 
sector, one of the most easily identified users of environmental services (Rodríguez 2005). With the assistance of 
FUNDECOR, the Costa Rican nongovernmental organization, FONAFIFO’s first contacted Energía Global, then 
owner of the Volcan and Don Pedro hydroelectric plants (Chomitz et al. 1999). Discussions with FONAFIFO staff, 
along with information on the organization’s website, suggest that soliciting user financing remains an important 
activity. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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3.2. Costa Rica’s Private Hydroelectric Sector 
Although Costa Rican private hydroelectric plants have clear profit motives, their history 
suggests that regulation and politics also have considerable influence on their decision making. 
The U.S.-based Electric Bond and Share Company was the first major producer in the country, 
operating as a monopoly (Quesada Mateo et al. 2002). It was nationalized in 1928 and eventually 
evolved into the National Power and Light Company (Compañia Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, 
CNFL) and the Costa Rican Electric Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE), the 
two government-owned electric companies that produce and distribute the vast majority of Costa 
Rica’s electricity.  
Private energy producers, including regional energy cooperatives, have always operated 
alongside the public sector. Nonetheless, their legal status was ambiguous until a 1990 law 
formalized their right to generate power and required them to sell all their output to ICE. This 
law spurred the construction of numerous small private plants during the 1990s. In recent years, 
electricity has been produced by 35 private plants, including wind, geothermal, and biomass 
plants (see Appendix). Twenty-four private hydroelectric plants owned by 18 firms were 
operating in 2007. All are relatively small run-of-the-river plants ranging in size from 0.6 MW to 
17.3 MW (Table A1). Of the plants for which we have data, all have a reservoir volume 
equivalent to eight hours or less of water supply.  
Politically, private electricity generation in Costa Rica is highly contentious. The 1990 
law that authorized private generation encountered stiff opposition for at least four reasons. First, 
even small run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants have significant adverse environmental impacts, 
including reducing in-stream flows in a portion of the river, disturbing forest cover in 
construction sites, and damaging aquatic life, all of which can create tension with local 
communities. As a result, national environmental NGOs initially opposed private 
hydroelectricity (Miranda et al. 2007). Second, leading politicians invested heavily in new 
private generating plants, raising concerns about undue political influence on the granting of 
water concessions, environmental licensing, and regulation (Romero-Pérez 2004). Third, 
investors proposed building plants in indigenous reserves (Marchamalo and Romero 2007). 
Finally, a continuing concern has also been that allowing private investment in the power sector 
would have adverse economic consequences for ICE and CNFL (Estaban 2009).  
Opposition to private hydroelectricity has stifled new investment and created 
considerable regulatory and economic uncertainty for existing plants. In 1996, shortly after most 
existing private hydroelectric plants were established, a new law reorganized regulatory authority Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
12 
for electricity but created a legal vacuum by neglecting to assign authority for reauthorizing 
existing water concessions (which have a 15-year term) and granting new ones. Despite lobbying 
by the private hydroelectric sector, opponents of private hydroelectricity helped stall legislation 
needed to fill this vacuum until 2009, just before many concessions expired. MINAET, the same 
agency that houses FONAFIFO, now has responsibility for water concessions. Hence, between 
1996 and 2009, existing private plants operated under the threat that their water concessions 
would not be renewed (Oviedo 2005; Agüero 2006; Estaban 2009).  
All electricity generated in Costa Rica must be sold to a government-owned 
monopsonistic buyer (ICE), and electricity prices are fixed by the Public Services Regulatory 
Authority (Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Públicos, ARESEP). For most plants, 
ARESEP uses complicated pricing formulas tied to the long-term marginal costs of production to 
ICE (ARESEP 2007, 2002). However, prices can vary significantly from one plant to the next.14 
Although certified “green” electric power has made significant inroads in industrialized countries 
(Menz 2005; Kotchen and Moore 2007), to our knowledge, it has yet to be introduced in Costa 
Rica. 
Conventional wisdom, including within the hydroelectric sector, holds that forest 
conservation benefits hydroelectric plants by regulating in-stream flows, reducing sedimentation, 
and in some cases, increasing dry-season flows. As one interviewee remarked, “The watershed is 
doing the work for you—it’s part of the machine.” For this reason, the hydroelectric sector was 
targeted early for participation in the PSA program. It is worth noting, however, that contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the effect of forest cover on hydrology is complex and dependent on 
specific local conditions. The scientific foundation for some general relationships between forest 
cover and hydrology, including negative correlations between forest cover on one hand and 
sedimentation and peak flows on the other, are reasonably well established. However, evidence 
for other general relationships, including that between forest cover and total annual flows, is 
                                                 
14 Three types of contracts predominated in 2008. “Variable” contracts are fixed in dollars at a “theoretical” rate of 
$0.06 per kilowatt-hour, but vary in colones. The theoretical rate is that which a plant would be paid on average if it 
generated at full capacity for the entire year (Barrantes-Chaves 2008). “Fixed” contracts are paid based on an 
ARESEP formula that periodically adjusts to estimate the long-term marginal costs of production to ICE. Finally, 
two private plants (El General and La Joya) operate under “build-operate-and-transfer” contracts at prices that were 
bid for a fixed term, after which ownership of the plant is transferred to the government. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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much weaker (Stadtmüller 1994; Kaimowitz 2004).15 Small run-of-the-river plants, like the 
private plants in Costa Rica, are principally concerned with regulating in-stream flow and 
reducing sedimentation, and less with total annual flows.  
4. How Many and What Types of Environmental Service Users are Participating? 
This section focuses on the number and type of environmental service users that have 
voluntarily contributed to the user-financed component of the PSA program. We first examine 
contributions from all sources, and then focus on contributions from private hydroelectric plants.  
4.1. All Sources 
According to FONAFIFO, as of 2009, US$8.2 million in payments for environmental 
services has come from user financing (Table 2). These monies have funded 3 percent of the 
hectares enrolled in the program (Table 1). However, of all the funding that FONAFIFO 
categorizes as user financing, 73 percent has come from sources that are not purely private in 
nature. Government-owned electric companies (CNFL and ICE) have provided 71 percent, and a 
nongovernmental organization with close ties to the government, together with a public utility, 
provided another 2 percent.16 Excluding these sources, 41 private firms, organizations, and 
individuals have contributed a total $2.2 million, which amounts to 27 percent of total user 
financing.  
                                                 
15 Indeed, Rojas and Aylward (2003, 79) argue that popular thinking about the relationship between forest cover and 
hydrology is suffused with “a series of assumptions, invalid methodologies and erroneous results and conclusions 
being cited over and over again, all of which seemingly builds a basis on which further [PES] market development is 
based.”  Aylward et al. (1999) suggest that forest cover may be less beneficial to a hydroelectric plant than other 
land uses. 
16 FONAFIFO also classifies as user financing $441,000 from Global Environment Facility (GEF) channeled 
through Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE), a multilateral agricultural research 
and education institution. However, as a reviewer points out, given their source, these funds are distinct from the 
others listed in Table 2. Therefore, we exclude them from the table.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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Table 2. User-financed contributions to FONAFIFO, 2003–2009 




of total from 
all donors 
Percentage 









Hydroelectric , government owned*  5,825  71.4  --  99.9 
Hydroelectric , private  919  11.3  41.2  100.0 
Brewery 273  3.3  12.2  100.0 
Carbon 216  2.6  9.7  0.0 
Agriculture related  201  2.5  9.0  99.5 
Tourism 189  2.3  8.5  59.6 
Agricultural cooperative  154  1.9  6.9  73.2 
Airline 122  1.5  5.5  23.3 
Carbon, NGO*
b  100 1.2  --  0 
Association, individual  67  0.8  3.0  2.5 
Construction   57  0.7  2.6  100.0 
Hydroelectric, cooperative  22  0.3  1.0  100.0 
Public utility*  9  0.1  --  100.0 
Plastics 9  0.1  0.4  100.0 
Consulting, advertising  1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
        
Total  8,164 100.0  --  92.6 
Total from purely private sources  2,230 27.3 100.0  77.8 
aExcludes funds from three categories of users (indicated with asterisk): government-owned hydroelectric 
firms, a government-owned utility, and a carbon NGO. 
bPax Natura, a Utah-based NGO that sells personal carbon credits. Because of its close ties to the Costa Rican 
government, we do not categorize it as purely private. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from Garcia (2009). 
 
As noted above, the PSA program aims to ensure the provision of four forest 
environmental services: biodiversity, carbon sequestration, scenic beauty, and hydrological 
benefits. FONAFIFO keeps track of which of these services are targeted by environmental 
service users that contribute to the PSA program. These data are reported in the last column of 
Table 2. Overall, 93 percent of all funds, and 78 percent of funds from purely private sources, 
targeted hydrological services. These services were the sole stated concern of the hydroelectric 
plants, the brewery, the construction firms, and the plastics firms. Carbon sequestration was the 
only other environmental service targeted by more than 1 percent of the program’s funds. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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4.2. Private Hydroelectric Sector 
As of June 2009, private hydroelectric plants had contributed US$919,000 to FONAFIFO 
(Table 2). These funds represent 41 percent of all financing from purely private resource users, 
the largest share from any economic sector. They were contributed by five plants owned by four 
firms (Table 3).17 Twenty-four private hydroelectric plants were active in 2007 (Table A1). 
Hence, slightly less than one-quarter of the private hydroelectric plants active in 2007 had signed 
contracts with FONAFIFO. The five private hydroelectric plants that made payments to 
FONAFIFO all participated in the agency’s Forest Protection program. However, the contractual 
basis of the contributions differed (Table 3). Four plants contributed via a negotiated payment. In 
most cases, they negotiated a per hectare contribution that was less than FONAFIFO’s actual 
payment (on the grounds that they were paying only for hydrological benefits, one of the four 
environmental services provided by forests). In each case, FONAFIFO contributed the difference 
between the negotiated contribution and the actual payment. One plant purchased CSAs. Finally, 
three plants have paid 25 percent of their mandatory water tariff directly to FONAFIFO (instead 
of to tax authorities) under provisions of the 2006 water law, in addition to making voluntary 
payments through the PSA program.   
Private hydroelectric firms’ contributions to FONAFIFO were a relatively small 
percentage of their revenues. In each case, annual contributions constituted less than 1 percent of 
annual revenues (Table 4). For the two firms that were first to participate (Energía Global and 
Matamoros), contributions were roughly equivalent to the average revenue from a single day of 
operation. Firms that contributed later gave substantially larger amounts, both in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of their annual revenue. This may suggest that FONAFIFO’s ability to 
negotiate increased over time.  
 
                                                 
17 In addition, in 1998 one private hydroelectric plant, La Esperanza, signed a contract for payments (on 3,000 
hectares) directly with a local environmental NGO, the Monteverde Conservation League, to settle a land dispute. 
See Rojas and Aylward (2003). We do not count this plant as a PSA participant because its contract did not involve 
FONAFIFO.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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Table 3. FONAFIFO payments for environmental services contracts signed by private 
hydroelectric plants, by type 1997–2009 











Negotiated agreements with FONAFIFO      
Energía G./Enel,
a Don Pedro  1997, 2003, 2009  1,000  10, 12, 16  12,000 – 16,000 
Energía G./Enel,
a Volcán  1997, 2003, 2009  1,000  10, 12, 16  12,000 – 16,000 
Matamoros, Platanar  2000, 2003  750 15,  30
c 22,500 
Holcim, Aguas Zarcas  2005  1,666 30  52,500 
FONAFIFO CSAs      
Tuis, Tuis  2005  75 57  4,286 
Direct payment of water tariff to FONAFIFO      
Enel,
a Don Pedro   2007  10 64  620 
Enel,
a Rio Volcán  2007  11 64  716 
Matamoros, Platanar  2007  24 64  1,528 
aIn 2001, Enel GreenPower, an Italian energy firm, purchased Energía Global, a Costa Rican firm (Business 
Wire 2001). 
bFigures from FONAFIFO contract; actual hectares enrolled may differ. 
cAt the end of 2004, Platanar was paying US$15/ha for 284 hectares with land title (285 ha at the end of 
2004) and US$30/ha for 385 hectares without title.  
Sources: Rojas and Aylward (2003); Garcia (2009); Pagiola (2008). 
 
Table 4. Annual PSA payments as percentage of annual revenues 
Firm, plant(s) 
Year of first 
agreement 
Annual PSA contributions as 
percentage of average annual 
revenues
a 
Energía Global, Don Pedro, and Volcán  1997 0.24 
Matamoros, Platanar  1999 0.29 
Holcim, Aguas Zarcas  2005  0.94 
Tuis, Tuis  2007  0.78 
Average    0.56 
aPSA expenditure data from Table 3 converted to 2000 dollars. Revenue data calculated using 
ARESEP 2008, converted to 2000 dollars, and averaged for all years from 1996 to 2007 for which 
plants operated a full year.  
Sources: Own calculation from data in Rojas and Aylward (2002), ARESEP (2008), and Garcia (2009). 
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5. What Factors Drive Participation in the Private Hydroelectric Sector? 
To identify the drivers of private hydroelectric plants’ participation in the PES program, 
we undertook two types of analyses. First, we asked plant owners and managers about the 
importance of various benefits of participation. Second, we compared average characteristics of 
program participants and nonparticipants to identify characteristics correlated with participation. 
Below, we discuss the data used for each analysis and then present results from each. We find 
that in addition to the provision of forest environmental services, an important motive for 
participation was the desire to improve relations with regulators and local communities. 
Participants tended to be large and/or to have characteristics associated with large plants, and 
they tended to be located in lightly deforested watersheds with a relatively low proportion of 
land in protected areas.  
5.1. Data 
Between February and June 2008, we conducted in-person interviews with owners or 
managers of 17 of the 18 companies that owned the 24 active private hydroelectric plants in 
Costa Rica.18 When one firm owned two or more plants in the same watershed, we treated them 
as a single production unit.19 The interviews were semistructured and included both closed-ended 
and open-ended questions about respondents’ perceptions, plant and watershed characteristics, 
and contacts with FONAFIFO. Because the respondents were not able or willing to answer all of 
our closed-ended questions, the number of responses varies by question. The interview data are 
supplemented by official statistics on plants’ contributions to FONAFIFO, pricing, and 
revenues.20 
We exclude two nonparticipant plants—the large La Joya and El General plants—from 
the analysis because unusual institutional circumstances may have driven their decisions to 
                                                 
18 See list of interviewees in the Appendix. In all but two cases, we interviewed the manager of the plant, and in five 
cases, the manager was also one of the plant’s owners. We could not obtain an in-person interview with the manager 
of one firm and therefore conducted a telephone interview with a former manager who had been involved in the PES 
program; this interview did not cover all the questions asked of the other firms. Anonymity was guaranteed to all 
respondents. 
19 Three firms owned more than one plant in a single watershed: Energía Global/Enel (Don Pedro and Volcan 
plants), O&M Eléctrica Matamoros S.A. (Matamoros and Plantar plants), and Edificadora Beta (Caño Grande and 
HidroVenecia plants). 
20 Because prices are set by ARESEP and all output is sold to ICE, revenue data are publicly available. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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participate or not participate. Both were developed and are operating under build-operate-and-
transfer (BOT) contracts in which, after a defined period, plant ownership will be transferred to 
ICE. These contracts create incentives that differ from those for the remaining 22 private 
hydroelectric plants. These 22 plants are all relatively small run-of-the-river plants. All have 
either no reservoir at all or very small reservoirs that are filled during off-peak hours and then 
used to generate electricity during the peak hours (when the electricity rates are higher).  
5.2. Perceived Benefits of Participation 
To shed light on the private hydroelectric plants’ motives for participation in the PSA 
program, we asked our interviewees about the importance of the following seven potential 
benefits, which we identified in open-ended preliminary interviews:  
•  forest protection and provision of environmental services;  
•  improved relations with local communities;  
•  improved political prospects at the national level;  
•  improved relations with other businesses;  
•  improved relations with government regulators;  
•  improved relations with ICE; and 
•  a catchall “other” category.  
The interviewees were given a printed list of these possible benefits and then asked to 
assess the importance of each benefit in two ways. First, we asked them to indicate the likelihood 
that PSA participation provides each benefit using a five-point Likert scale (with 1 representing 
“definitely no” and 5 representing “definitely yes”). Second, we asked interviewees to rank the 
first, second, and third most important benefit for their plant. The Likert exercise was partly 
meant to oblige respondents to briefly reflect on each potential benefit before ranking them. 
Table 5 presents results for all of our interviewees, and for subpopulations of participants and 
nonparticipants.  
Regarding the Likert rankings, our results suggest that virtually all of our interviewees 
believed PSA participation would provide each benefit (which is perhaps unsurprising, since the 
list of benefits was compiled from responses to a pilot survey’s open-ended questions about PSA 
benefits). For the population of all interviewees, the average Likert ranking ranged from 3.3 to Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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4.1. Average rankings were higher for participants than for nonparticipants, however, suggesting 
that participants were more convinced of these benefits.  
Regarding the relative ranking of the benefits, 80 percent of all interviewees chose “forest 
protection and provision environmental services” as the most important benefit of the program. 
The percentage was higher among participants (100 percent) than nonparticipants (75 percent). 
At least four-fifths of all interviewees and of subpopulations of participants and nonparticipants 
chose “improved relations with local communities” as the second most important reason for 
participation. Finally, at least half of all respondents and of subpopulations of participants and 
nonparticipants chose “improved relations with government regulators” as the third most 
important benefit.  
On their face, these relative ranking results suggest that hydroelectric plants participate in 
the PSA program mainly to obtain environmental services related to forest protection. However, 
these results must be interpreted with caution. Several strands of policy and economics literature 
support the idea that firms’ stated reasons for environmentally friendly actions often differ from 
their underlying reasons and that in interviews, firm managers may not be forthcoming about the 
latter. A growing literature examines corporate greenwashing—firms’ participation in 
environmental activities for reasons other than concern about environment (Laufer 2003; Lyon 
and Maxwell 2006; Greer and Bruno 1996). In addition, economic research has demonstrated 
that survey respondents derive a “warm glow” from exhibiting environmentally friendly 
attitudes, a factor that biases their responses (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; Nunes and 
Schokkaert 2003). Finally, both psychologists and economists have documented “cognitive 
dissonance,” the tendency of people to seek consistency among their beliefs, including by 
mirroring what they perceive to be opinions that are socially acceptable and those that they 
believe their interviewers expect (Akerlof and Dickens 1982; Rabin 1994). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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Table 5. Rankings of importance of different benefits provided by PSA program  
as perceived by participants (Parts.) and nonparticipants (Non.)  
 
 
Program provide this benefit?
1= definitely no  
5 = definitely yes 
Percentage who said this 
was 1st most important 
Percentage who said this was 
2nd most important 
Percentage who said this was 
3rd most important 
Benefit All  Parts.  Non.  All  Parts.  Non. All Parts.  Non.  All Parts.  Non. 
Forest protection and 
provision of environmental 
services 
4.1  5.0  3.8  80  100  75  0 0 0  14 0  20 
Improved relations with 
local communities  4.1  4.3 4.0 7  0  8 80 67 83  0  0  0 
Improved political 
prospects at national level  3.3  4.0 3.1 7  0  8 13 33  8  14 25 10 
Improved relations with 
other businesses  3.5  3.7  3.5  0 0 0  0 0 0 7 0  10 
Improved relations with 
government regulators  4.0  5.0  3.8  0 0 0  7 0 8  57  50  60 
Improved relations with 
ICE  3.6  5.0  3.2  0 0 0  0 0 0 7 25  0 
Other       7 0 8  0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Total
*       100 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Number of observations  15  3  12  15 3 12  15 3 12  14  4
** 10 
* Some columns do not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
** One respondent ranked two benefits as the third most important. 
Source: Authors’ survey. 
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Given these confounding issues, we are not able to determine with certainty whether 
hydroelectric plants participated in the PSA program mainly to secure environmental services, as 
our rankings results suggest, or mainly for other reasons. However, our interviewees’ answers to 
other open-ended questions reinforce the hypothesis that—as Miranda et al. (2007) conclude—
improving relations with communities and regulators were significant motives for participation. 
Responses to open-ended questions about the benefits of PSA participation often focused on 
tensions with local communities resulting from hydroelectric plants’ adverse environmental 
impacts, particularly reduced in-stream flows. For example, the manager of one participating 
plant commented that PSA contributions, in essence a transfer of funds from the plant to local 
land managers, help “improve the image of the common people about private energy plants in 
our area.”21  
Responses to open-ended questions about the reasons for PSA participation also 
highlighted the national political and regulatory climate for private hydroelectricity. As discussed 
in Section 3.2, private hydroelectricity in Costa Rica is highly contentious politically because of 
concerns about undue political influence on contracting and licensing, environmental 
degradation, and ICE’s financial sustainability. Partly as a result, a de facto moratorium on water 
concessions for private hydroelectricity prevailed between 1996 and 2009, during which time 
plants operated under the threat that their water concessions would not be renewed. Plant 
managers’ interview comments suggested that some viewed PSA participation a means of 
softening political opposition and improving prospects for reauthorization of water concessions. 
For example, the manager of another participating plant said, “For the image of the company, the 
fact that we are in the PSA program will facilitate opportunities in the future.”22 
5.3. Participants versus Nonparticipants 
Multivariate regression analysis would be the ideal method of identifying the 
characteristics of hydroelectric plants that are correlated with participation. However, with a 
maximum of 18 observations, more than 15 explanatory variables, and some missing 
observations, we simply do not have enough data for econometric analysis. Therefore, we use the 
                                                 
21 All translations by the authors. 
22 Note that the link between PSA participation and improving relations with regulators is weakened somewhat by 
the fact that participation has a strong public goods aspect: one plant’s participation presumably has spillover 
benefits for all plants. We are grateful to a reviewer for this point.  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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second-best approach: we compare average characteristics of participants and nonparticipants. 
Differences between these averages indicate direct or indirect correlation between a 
characteristic and participation, although it is not possible to determine whether there is a causal 
relationship. As discussed below, a drawback of this method is that we are not able to control for 
correlations between the plant characteristics.23  
We examine a wide variety of characteristics listed in Table 6, including the plant’s (i) 
technical, financial, and contractual features (power output, annual revenue, and ownership); (ii) 
relationship with FONAFIFO (simple knowledge of the institution and prior contacts); and (iii) 
watershed (forest cover and legal protection).  
5.3.1. Size, Revenue, Ownership, and Relationship with FONAFIFO 
Our data show that average participant plants tend to be larger than average 
nonparticipants and to have characteristics associated with large plants, including relatively high 
revenues, corporate ownership, and direct contact with FONAFIFO (Table 6). Differences in all 
of these average characteristics are statistically significant. The generating capacity of the 
average participant is 16.2 MW, while that of the average nonparticipant is 4.2 MW, almost a 
fourfold difference. Annual revenue for average participants is $6.1 million per year, while that 
for average nonparticipants is $1.9 million, a threefold difference. Three of the five plants with 
highest annual revenue are participants (Figure 1). It is also noteworthy that two of the four 
participating plants are owned by international corporations (and another is owned by a Costa 
Rican family that owns or operates five hydroelectric plants in Costa Rica and has developed 
plants internationally). By contrast, none of the nonparticipants are owned by international 
companies. Finally, 100 percent of participants surveyed reported having been asked by 
FONAFIFO to join the PSA program, while only 45 percent of nonparticipants said they had 
been contacted. The plants not contacted tend to be among the smallest plants in the sector. Of 
                                                 
23 For example, say we find a positive correlation between plant size and participation and a second positive 
correlation between public ownership of the plant and participation. Further, say we know that these two 
explanatory variables are correlated; that is, large firms tend to be publicly owned. We are not able to determine 
whether there is a causal relationship between public ownership and participation, or just a correlation between 
public ownership and firm size. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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the 17 plants for which we have data, 10 of the 11 plants larger than 1 MW were contacted by 
FONAFIFO, and 5 of the 6 smaller plants were not.24  
 
Table 6. Average characteristics and perceptions of private hydroelectric firms and 
plants by subpopulation (n) 
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How well is PSA program administered? 
[firm] 
1=bad Æ 








Likely to reenroll in PSA program? 
[firm] 
1=no Æ  
5 = yes  n/a  4.33 
(3)  n/a n/a 
a Test for difference in means between the participant and nonparticipant plants using one-tailed t-tests with 
heteroscedastic variances.  
b Firms with multiple plants are treated as a single unit. Analysis excludes the two BOT plants and La Esperanza. 
Sources: Authors’ survey; ARESEP (2008). 
 
 
                                                 
24 Several plants with little knowledge of the program indicated that they might be willing to participate in the 
program. It would seem, therefore, that there may be potential for the program to generate greater participation 
through more aggressive marketing. However, since the remaining plants are quite small, the cost to FONAFIFO of 
initiating those contacts may be great relative to the benefits that might be obtained. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
24 
Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of revenue per year for private hydroelectric plants, 
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aThe first year of operation of a plant is excluded so that only full years are counted. Multiple 
plants owned by a single owner are treated as a single unit. 
Sources: Authors’ survey; ARESEP (2008). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine whether plant size, revenues, ownership, or 
contact with FONAFIFO are actually driving participation because these characteristics are 
highly correlated with each other: large plants generate more revenue, are more likely to be 
owned by corporations, and are more likely to have been contacted by FONAFIFO. That said, 
each characteristic could, in theory, have an independent effect on participation. Plants contacted 
by FONAFIFO may be more likely to participate because such contacts reduce transaction and 
informational costs. In addition to the fact that larger plants were more likely to be contacted, 
these plants also tend to have dedicated environmental staff and might be more likely to 
participate because they are able to afford costs of participation, including transaction costs and 
payments to FONAFIFO. Revenues aside, large plants may also be more likely to participate 
because they have more serious environmental impacts and, therefore, perceive greater benefits 
from participation or are under greater pressure from regulators, local communities, and national Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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environmental activists. It is also plausible that larger plants and those owned by corporations 
may derive greater benefits from participation if they are particularly concerned about their 
national and international reputations.  
5.3.2. Watershed 
Our survey responses indicate that participating plants tend to be located in heavily 
forested, lightly protected watersheds, whereas nonparticipants tend to be located either in 
heavily forested, heavily protected watersheds or in heavily deforested, lightly protected 
watersheds (Table 6, Figures 2 and 3). Of the 3 participating plants for which we have data on 
forest cover and protection, all are located in watersheds with substantial forest cover, and 2 are 
in watersheds that are lightly protected (Figure 2). The watershed of a third participant is mostly 
inside a national park, but the plant has worked with FONAFIFO to ensure that the hectares that 
receive payments are outside the park.25 As for the nonparticipants, the distribution of forest 
cover and protection is bimodal (Figure 2). Among the 12 nonparticipants for which we have 
data on watershed forest cover and protection, 58 percent were sited in watersheds that either 
were almost completely forested and completed protected by law, or were almost completely 
deforested with little or no protection.  
What might explain the observed relationship between PSA participation and watershed 
characteristics summarized in Figure 3? For the sake of argument, in answering this question we 
leave aside the evidence cited above—that plants’ participation decisions are driven by local and 
national politics instead of concerns about hydrological services. Also, it is important to note that 
PSA participation is very unlikely to have caused low rates of deforestation. Only 1 of the 18 
firms we surveyed, including both PSA participants and nonparticipants, reported more than 1 
percent change in forest cover in the watershed since 1998. This finding comports with data 
derived from satellite images indicating that net deforestation nationwide has been minimal since 
the passage of new forestry laws in 1996 (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007; Pfaff et al. 2008). 
                                                 
25 FONAFIFO allows landowners inside protected areas to participate in the PSA program only if they have not yet 
been compensated for their land. Such landowners, however, have highest priority for FONAFIFO funding (Sánchez 
Chávez 2008). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
 
26 
Figure 2. Watershed protection and forest cover percentages for participating and nonparticipating plants 
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Source: Authors’ survey. 
 
Figure 3. Breakdown of PSA participation and nonparticipation by private hydroelectric plants by watershed 
characteristics: forest cover and legal protection 
  
    Forest cover 
    High Low 
Legal protection 
High  A. Nonparticipants  n/a 
Low  B. Participants  C. Nonparticipants 
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Having said that, the relationship between participation and watershed characteristics can 
be explained by expected benefits and costs of participation, where expected benefits are a 
function of both the level of forest cover and the risk that it will be lost absent PSA contracts. For 
plants in quadrant B of Figure 3 (high forest cover, low legal protection), expected benefits of 
PSA participation are relatively high because plentiful forest cover is providing important 
hydrological services that could theoretically be lost because the forest is not legally protected. 
As Pagiola (2008, 719) notes, in heavily forested watersheds, a strong precautionary principle 
argument can be made for PSA contracts to avoid changes that might threaten the provision of 
ecosystem services. For plants in quadrant A (high forest cover, high legal protection), expected 
benefits are low because even though forest cover is plentiful, there is little risk of deforestation. 
In addition, FONAFIFO does not negotiate PSA contracts with landowners in protected areas 
(unless they have not been compensated by the state for their land). For plants in quadrant C, 
expected benefits are low because forest cover is limited, and expected costs are high because 
reforestation is expensive relative to forest protection. Indeed, in open-ended responses, 
representatives of plants in quadrants A and C stated that with a watershed either completely 
deforested or completely protected, there was very little that FONAFIFO could do. Finally, 
presumably little land in hydroelectric plants’ watersheds falls into the last quadrant (low forest 
cover, high legal protection).    
6. In the View of Environmental Service Users, How Has the Program Performed? 
The survey included two questions about the performance of the PSA program (Table 6). 
We asked respondents to use a Likert scale to indicate how well the PSA program is 
administered (with 1 signifying “very poorly” and 5 signifying the opposite). The average 
respondent ranked program administration between “ok” and “good” (3.64). Average rankings of 
participants and nonparticipants (3.67 versus 3.63) were not very different. We also asked 
participants to use a Likert scale to indicate how likely they were to participate in the PSA 
program once their current five-year commitment expired (with 1 signifying “definitely no” and 
5 signifying the opposite). The three participants who responded all answered “probably yes” or 
“definitely yes,” and the fourth plant, which we were unable to interview, renewed its 
participation for the second time in 2009. In sum, most participants and nonparticipants believe 
that the administration of the PSA program is at least adequate, and participants believe that the 
benefits of contributing to the user-financed component of the program exceed the costs.  
That said, positive views of the program were not unanimous. In response to an open-
ended question, one nonparticipant said his plant has not participated because “We don’t like to Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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give money away that will be wasted,” and another said, “I don’t trust MINAE; that’s why I’m 
paying park guards directly.”   
Survey data on plants’ private investments in forest conservation provide additional 
nuance. Seventy-three percent of the plants surveyed reported having made such investments. All 
three PSA participants who responded to our questions on the matter said they invest in 
conservation activities independent of the PSA program by, for example, conducting 
conservation education in local communities and planting trees in their watersheds. Such 
activities were also quite common among nonparticipants. Eight of the 13 managers of 
nonparticipating plants who responded to this question said they invested in forest protection 
outside the PSA program, including by paying the legal expenses of park managers fighting land 
claims, funding the demarcation of park boundaries, paying for park guards, and helping to 
finance paving an access road to a nearby national park in hopes that it would boost ecotourism 
and dampen incentives to clear tree cover. 
Managers of some plants participating in the PSA program indicated that they viewed 
these activities as complements to the program, as in the case of a plant that provides 
environmental tours highlighting its participation in the PSA program. However, managers of 
some nonparticipating plants made clear they viewed these private conservation investments as 
substitutes for participation in the PSA program. In some cases, their investments had the same 
broad objective as the PSA program—protecting forest on private land. In other cases, the 
private investments by nonparticipating plants aimed at ensuring benefits not provided by the 
PSA program. Examples include plants that invested in stemming the dumping of trash in rivers 
in urban areas, and in improving management of nearby national parks. The implication of these 
private investments is that notwithstanding their positive ratings of the PSA program’s 
administration, not all of the plant managers believe the program is the only or most cost-
effective means of ensuring the environmental health of their watersheds. 
7. Conclusion 
We have used an original survey of Costa Rica’s private hydroelectric plants along with 
government statistics to analyze the user-financed component of the country’s payments for 
ecosystem services program. We focused on three issues: (i) the number and type of 
environmental service users that participate; (ii) the factors driving participation in the private 
hydroelectricity sector; and (iii) and the perceptions of plant managers in this sector regarding 
the performance of the program. As for the first issue, we found that thus far, user financing Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
29 
represents a small fraction of total funding for the PSA program and that what funding has been 
obtained has come largely from users interested in hydrological services.  
Regarding the drivers of participation in the private hydroelectric sector, we found that 
although most plant managers interviewed—including both participants and nonparticipants—
cited forest protection and the provision of environmental services as the main benefit of 
participation, they also emphasized improved relations with local communities and with 
government regulators—both factors that researchers repeatedly have identified as drivers of 
participation in other voluntary environmental programs. We also found that the following types 
of plants were more likely to participate: large plants, those with characteristics associated with 
large plants (including relatively high revenues, corporate ownership, and direct contact with 
FONAFIFO), and plants in heavily forested but lightly protected watersheds.  
The data do not permit us to identify with certainty plants’ motives for participating. 
However, we can draw two broad conclusions. First, the prominence among participants of large 
plants that had been contacted by FONAFIFO suggests that transaction costs may be an 
important barrier to participation. Second, the weight of evidence suggests that improved 
relations with communities and regulators are significant motives, along with the desire to 
protect the forest and provide environmental services. In both closed-ended questions and 
(especially) open-ended questions, interviewees highlighted the importance of improved 
relations with communities and regulators.  
Finally, as for the perceived performance of the PSA program, the average environmental 
service users we interviewed reported a more or less favorable impression. However, the fact that 
some plants are making their own private investments in forest conservation in their watersheds, 
instead of paying FONAFIFO to do this, suggests that plants do not view the PSA program as the 
only or most cost-effective means of achieving their environmental goals. 
What are the policy implications of these findings for national PES program generally 
and for Costa Rica’s PSA program more specifically? We hypothesized that user financing might 
improve the efficiency of national PES programs. Our findings raise questions about this 
hypothesis. If environmental service users participate in hybrid PES programs for reasons other 
than ensuring the provision of environmental services, then they are less likely to help 
government administrators identify providers of important environmental services, value these 
services, or monitor compliance with PES contracts. In fact, their participation could contribute 
to inefficiency. For example, if a large private hydroelectric plant in a heavily protected 
watershed contributes to a PES program mainly to win political points with national regulatory Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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authorities, then FONAFIFO’s scarce financial and human resources would be wasted in the 
sense that they are used to prevent deforestation where it is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, 
we did find that the majority of the nonparticipants are located in areas where the program is 
unlikely to provide any benefits, while participants were in areas where benefits were at least 
possible (Figure 3).   
We also hypothesized that private financing might improve the financial sustainability of 
a national PES program. In this case, our conclusions are mixed. Despite the widespread 
perception that the PSA program offers hydrological benefits, we find little evidence that 
participation in the program has actually generated such benefits or that nonparticipation has led 
to hydrological costs or higher rates of deforestation. The failure of the PSA program to affect 
deforestation has been shown by others (Robalino et al. 2008; Arriagada 2008; Sills et al. 2006) 
and is confirmed here: neither participants nor nonparticipants reported significant deforestation 
in their watersheds. This does not bode well for the sustainability of voluntary contributions; if 
hydrological benefits are not eventually substantiated by plants’ experiences then favorable 
perceptions of the program are unlikely to persist. Furthermore, if finite political and reputational 
objectives instead of demand for environmental services drive private contributions to a national 
PES program, then there may be a limit on the amount that private parties are willing to 
contribute. For example, in Costa Rica, if contributions by private hydroelectric plants have been 
motivated by a need to soften political opposition, they may no longer be needed now that this 
opposition has diminished and the de facto ban on reauthorizing existing plants and building new 
ones has been lifted.  
But on the other hand, if political and reputational benefits drive contributions, then 
program administrators can encourage contributions by enhancing these benefits. This can be 
accomplished by raising the public profile of the user-financed component of the PES programs, 
following the lead of well-known voluntary environmental programs like ISO 14001 and the 
U.S. EPA “partnership” programs. In addition, if participation is driven by variations in 
transaction costs across ecosystem service providers, then program administrators can expand 
participation by seeking to lower these costs by, for example, improving marketing. 
As for Costa Rica, now that hydroelectric plants and other water users are essentially 
required to pay part of their water tariff to FONAFIFO, and now that the deforestation rate has 
declined dramatically nationwide, the era of purely voluntary contributions from users of Resources for the Future  Blackman and Woodward 
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hydrological services may be nearing an end.26 However, there is still room for FONAFIFO to 
improve targeting of payments for environmental services and to provide environmental services 
that benefit a wider range of users. FONAFIFO could do this by reaching out to the many 
hydroelectric plants that have not yet participated and identifying how environmental services in 
their watersheds could be improved. This may involve activities other than paying private 
landowners not to clear forests. Although Costa Rica’s net deforestation rate has been 
substantially reduced, there remain activities that can increase the supply of environmental 
services, such as improving monitoring of parks or improving environmental education. Some 
hydroelectric plants already fund such activities voluntarily. The government can use these 
investments to indicate how the PSA program might be modified to provide the environmental 






                                                 
26 Direct payments to FONAFIFO of Canon de Agua fees from all economic sectors may be poised to replace 
purely voluntary contributions as the primary source of FONAFIFO user financing. In the hydroelectric sector, 
however, these direct payments have thus far been small compared with purely voluntary contributions (Table 3). 
The reason may be that in this sector, plants’ willingness to contribute exceeds their Canon de Agua obligations. 
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Appendix  
Table A1. Private electricity providers in Costa Rica 









no  Aeroenergía S.A.  Aeroenergía S.A.  Wind  1998  yes  6,750  no 
no  Azucarera el Viejo S.A.  El Viejo  Biomass  ≤1996  no 866
c no 
yes  Coneléctricas R. L.  Coneléctricas R. L.  Hydro  1997  yes  17,299  no 
yes  Desarrollos Energéticos MW S.A.  San Gabriel  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 395  no 
yes  Doña Julia  Doña Julia  Hydro  1999  yes  16,470  no 
yes  Edificadora Beta  Caño Grande  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 2,905  no 
"   "  El  Embalse  Hydro  1997  yes  2,000  no 
"   "  HidroVenecia  Hydro  1999  yes  3,375  no 
yes  El Angel  El Angel  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 3,424  no 
yes
a  Enel GreenPower  Don Pedro  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 14,000  yes 
"   "  Volcán  Hydro  1997  yes 17,000  yes 
yes  Hidroeléctrica Tuis S.A.   Tuis Hydro  1999  yes  1,799  yes 
yes  Holcim of Costa Rica  Aguas Zarcas  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 14,208  yes 
yes  Ingenio Quebrada Azul Ltda.  Quebrada Azul  Hydro  1998  yes  300  no 
no  Ingenio Taboga S.A.  Ingenio Taboga S.A.  Biomass  2006  yes  20,000  no 
yes
b  Inversiones La Manguera S.A.  La Esperanza  Hydro  2000  yes  5,506  yes
b 
yes  La Lucha  La Lucha  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 339  no 
yes  La Rebeca  La Rebeca  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 60  no 
yes  Hidroeléctrica Rio Lajas  Rio Lajas  Hydro  1997  yes  11,000  no 
yes Losko  S.A  Poas  Hydro  1997  yes  2,125 no 
" "  Rio  Segundo  Hydro  1998  yes  628  no 
yes O&M  Eléctrica  Matamoros S.A.   El General  Hydro (BOT)  2006  yes  39,000  no 
"   "  Matamoros  (various)  Hydro  1997  yes  3,819  no 
"   "  Platanar  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 14,594  yes 
no  Miravalles III  Miravalles III  Geothermal (BOT)  2000  yes  29,500  no 
no  Molinos de Viento Arenal S.A. Tierras  Morenas  Wind  1999  yes  9,480
c no 
no  Not active  Los Negritos  Hydro  ≤1996  no 39
c no 
no Not  active  Montezuma  Hydro  ≤1996  no 981  no 
no Not  active  Pejibaye  Hydro  ≤1996  no 49
c no 
no  Not active  San Rafael  Hydro  ≤1996  no 189
c no 
no  Not active  Santa Rufina  Hydro  ≤1996  no 292
c no 
no  Plantas Eólicas  Plantas Eólicas   Wind  ≤1996  yes 23,370  no 
yes  Sociedad Planta Eléctrica Tapezco  Tapezco  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 136  no 
yes  Suerkata S.R.L.  Suerkata S.R.L.  Hydro  ≤1996  yes 3,000  no 
yes
b  Union Fenosa  La Joya  Hydro (BOT)  2006  yes  51,000  no 
a Former manager was interviewed, but not all questions covered in survey were asked. Current management could not be interviewed. 
b Plant excluded from analysis for reasons discussed in Section 5.1. 
c Estimate based on maximum actual production between 1997 and 2007 and assuming 100 percent operation. 
Sources: ARESEP (2008); authors’ survey data and calculations. 